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Memory as object: a relation of proximity? 
 
 
One of the ways in which modernity defines itself is through the 
emphasis it places on experiences of loss that it represents as pervasive 
and irretrievable. This is a commonplace of nineteenth-century 
intellectual and literary culture, in which loss itself emerges as a distinct 
object of thought and plays a significant role in accounts of modernity 
that come to be influential, if not dominant.1 Thus, in his analysis of 
the politics of post-Revolutionary France, Constant laments the 
disadvantages of the mass societies characteristic of the modern world, 
where an ancient way of life, one in which individuals could flourish in 
social settings on a scale more proportionate to their capacities, is lost, 
irretrievably so.2 Constant’s argument turns on a paradox, in that the 
acknowledgement of loss is essential to the vision he seeks to rehearse 
of a modern form of politics, which, if it is to accommodate the 
indispensable freedom of the individual, must break with that of the 
ancient world. The point about loss is that it has become an enduring 
aspect of an identity, centred on the individual, that comes, in 
Constant’s analysis of the modern commercial state of society, to 
prevail.3 The emphasis which modernity gives to experiences of loss is 
                                                 
1 The disenchantment of loss is a Romantic topos; see Dennis Porter, Rousseau’s 
Legacy: Emergence and Eclipse of the Writer in France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), ch. 3. Auguste Comte by contrast presents certain forms of disenchantment as 
salutary: they contribute to the advent of a positivist approach to knowledge, based 
on the exclusive description of sensory data; see Philosophie des sciences, ed. J. Grange 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 44. 
2 De l’esprit de conquête et de l’usurpation, I, xiii, in Benjamin Constant, Écrits politiques, ed. 
M. Gauchet (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 164–71. The classic account, centred on the 
formative period of the Third Republic, of how a national identity is fashioned at the 
expense of locally rooted forms of belonging is Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: 
The Modernization of Rural France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). 
3 Much of the historical and political evaluation of liberalism in particular and features 
of modernity more generally consists in testing positive normative claims made with 
regard to a framework defined, in part at least, negatively: Gauchet (in the 
introduction to the edition of Constant cited) and Foucault (in his final lectures in the 
Collège de France) diverge sharply on whether or not the claim to self-limiting 
government in liberal theory is sustainable. The extent to which this complex 
intellectual framework amounts to a decisive gain continues to be a matter of debate 
in contemporary political theory; on the limited utility of the classic public–private 
distinction, see Raymond Geuss, Public Goods, Private Goods (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001); cf. Alastair Hannay, who identifies the public with the 
mediatized world, in the face of which the private individual, duly ‘transformed’, 
 significant for two reasons. It means that modernity is defined in part 
negatively, with reference to all of those things belonging to the past 
from which it is increasingly cut off. And the individual subject is 
affected by the ways in which loss connects with modernity as it comes 
into being: the social and cultural spaces in which as a result the subject 
circulates are heterogenous, alien, disproportionate. 
The point about this narrative is that it might urge us to 
acknowledge and to begin to think seriously about forms of loss that 
seem significant socially. At the same time, the individual emerges as a 
result as the site of a complex struggle involving not only loss and 
identity, but also, it transpires, memory and forgetting. And the scope 
of the latter proves to be quite unexpected. So says Proust’s Narrator, 
when, prompted by an encounter with a nameless Norwegian 
philosopher claiming to follow Bergson, he sketches a theory of 
forgetting in which loss is not the ultimate outcome: ‘Nous possédons 
tous nos souvenirs, sinon la faculté de nous les rappeler’. Things come 
to be effaced only in the sense that they are beyond the reach of 
subjective human memory. But they exist independently of our capacity 
to remember them.4 Forgetting could be said to be a significant force 
because it reveals subjective limits. Traces of the past do endure; it is 
merely that what we ordinarily invoke as memory is not something that 
we can mobilize so as to access them in a dependable way. The relation 
between self and world is transformed: the temporal mode in which the 
world exists is one of infinite accumulation of what we conventionally 
refer to as the past. But our frail memory cannot equip us to 
understand it. The possibility exists, then, that what we may happen to 
forget is not necessarility annihilated — and there seems to remain the 
counter-intuitive hope of continuing to ‘possess’, as the Narrator says, 
these objects. 
If we break with a purely subjective or personal perception of 
forgetting, then the possibility opens up of some new relationship with 
objects of memory. It is this possibility as it manifests itself in the work 
of the two thinkers, namely Michel de Certeau and D. W. Winnicott, 
with whom I shall be concerned here. Though there are no clear direct 
links between them, each explores possible connections between the 
subject and culture centred on what I shall call memory-objects, in 
other words, objects which give scope to the possibility of complex 
                                                                                                                
becomes the bearer of responsibility for maintaining common interests, in On the 
Public (London: Routledge, 2005), ch. 8.  
4 A la recherche du temps perdu, ed. J.-Y. Tadié, 4 vols (Paris : Gallimard, 1987–89), III, 
374–75. At a later point, the Narrator is more pessimistic in the face of loss, asking 
sceptically of ‘l’érudition’ whether it can succeed in overcoming even ‘un sur mille de 
ces oublis qui vont s’entassant?’ (IV, 301). Bergson characterizes memory as a feature 
of complex past–present interactions; see Matière et mémoire (Paris: PUF, 1946), 269–
71. For an account of the virtuality of memory, derived in part from Bergson, and of 
its potential to generate an image of time, see Gilles Deleuze, Cinéma 2: l’image-temps 
(Paris: Minuit, 1985), in particular, 129–64. On the significance of forgetting in 
Proust’s novel, see James H. Reid, Proust, Beckett, and Narration (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 1. 
 exchanges between forms of memory which, on the one hand, are 
ephemeral elements of embodied local practice and those which, on the 
other, can be analysed and documented as features of cultural memory 
within a wider social or cultural scene. What we might understand by 
forgetting and loss undergoes something of a revision: they form part 
of a process whose temporal framework is not necessarily that of 
human life. If we suspend for a moment the point of view of the 
individual human subject, then what we think to be lost exists simply in 
a space external to us which is governed by its own dynamic, one from 
which we may be excluded. The problem that we face is twofold: how 
to characterize this space; and how to reinvent a subjective response to 
it. 
 
Certeau argues that a characteristic concern of the human sciences is 
with the occluded object. The object impinges on the observer in such 
a way as to define his or her identity within a larger space; more 
specifically, the essentially negative orientation of his or her stance 
within it: ‘il y a sans nul doute, liée au métier d’ethnologue ou 
d’historien, une fascination de la limite ou, ce qui est presque identique, 
de l’autre’.5 In the work of Certeau and that of others influenced in 
turn by him, memory and loss are connected through processes which 
are above all social. Thus, for instance, Marc Augé claims that in the 
contemporary world the accumulation of artefacts of memory derives 
from our exclusion from a past which is in fact lost.6 The problem of 
the occluded object emerges, then, historically; we use memory as a 
cultural medium in response to temporal features of the societies we 
inhabit. At the same time, these temporal features can give rise to 
specific practices of memory: some merely perpetuate loss, in effect, by 
displacing it, while others may in some as yet undefined way 
compensate for our apparent losses.7  
Certeau gives some prominence to loss as an effect of 
modernity, in particular that of tradition. The effacement of tradition as 
a socially cohesive force means that social spaces are now characterized 
by the proliferation of ‘pratiques signifiantes’ which are fundamentally 
heterogeneous.8 Such a transformation calls, then, for a semiotic 
approach, within the context of which Certeau himself presents 
memory as something fundamentally ambiguous. Most obviously, it 
can serve as a means of institutionalizing meaning: discourses of 
popular culture typically amount to claims for continuity of memory 
                                                 
5 L’Écriture de l’histoire (Paris : Gallimard, 1975), 56–57. 
6 Non-lieux : introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité (Paris : Seuil, 1992), 37. 
7 Certeau seeks to explore how practices of history can be informed by the attempt to 
respond in some way to the kinds of exclusion that result from loss: ‘l’histoire est en 
cela, même si elle n’est que cela, le lieu privilégié où le regard s’inquiète’, in La Culture 
au pluriel, third edition (Paris: Seuil, 1993), 71. 
8 See La Culture au pluriel, 11–13.  
 which are in fact problematic.9 Thus, for instance, the attempt to 
document practices of the past as forms of popular culture is exposed 
to the risk of the scholastic fallacy: effective cultural practices are 
irretrievably abstracted from the circumstances of the historical agents 
who performed them, with the result that the observer’s account 
amounts to something of a fiction.10 Now, what an insistence on 
continuity of memory in just such a process can reveal is precisely the 
element of violence that a process of abstraction like this can imply. 
Certeau ultimately argues that what any history organized along these 
lines cannot but omit amounts to a ‘géographie de l’oublié’, the residue 
of what may now no longer be assimilated.11 In other words, only by 
acknowledging the partiality which inevitably affects historical 
explorations of the past can we say something about the ways in which 
memory is institutionalized.  
But, less obviously, a series of allusive and seemingly 
unsystematic mentions of memory point to the possibility that it may at 
the same time play a different role within culture. What Certeau seeks 
to show is that memory can be a factor that shapes a temporality in 
which the actions of the singular subject can be said to have a creative 
dimension. He takes care to make the point that the creative subject is 
not to be confused with the atomized individual posited by the 
analytical discourses characteristic of modernity: there is to be no 
‘retour aux individus’. If the individual, in an increasingly disseminated 
world, ‘perd sa place’, so as to become a ‘sujet’, it is as a response to a 
process like the emergence of modernity sketched at the outset. The 
innumerable subject is characterized by a marginality that is ‘massive’, 
that of a majority which is silent in the sense that it can be detected 
only through ‘une activité non signée, non lisible, non symbolisée’. The 
ephemerality to which Certeau gestures is intrinsic to the kind of 
cultural activity that owes its paradoxical existence to the sense that it 
borders on being lost. Creativity results from ‘une suite indéfinie 
d’actes concrets’ which are realized in particular, unpredictable 
circumstances; and, because indefinite and unpredictable, these acts 
exist only as traces which will always tend to be on the verge of being 
                                                 
9 See Morag Shiach, Discourse on Popular Culture (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), ch. 1. I have 
developed further my analysis of the difficult relationship between memory and 
popular culture, in ‘Common Culture and Creativity: Forgetting and Memory in the 
Cultural Theory of Michel de Certeau’, in E. Caldicott and A. Fuchs, ed., Cultural 
Memory: Essays in European Literature and History (Oxford — Bern — New York: Peter 
Lang, 2003), 311–24. 
10 On the social dimension of the problem of knowledge and on how elites take their 
own models (typically derived from the current state of a complex and changing 
process) to be equivalents of the real, see L’Invention du quotidien, I, 294–95. On the 
scholastic fallacy, which consists in equating the agent’s understanding of his or her 
world with the interpretative grids of the observer, see Pierre Bourdieu, Raisons 
pratiques: sur la théorie de l’action (Paris : Seuil, 1994), 223–24.  
11 La Culture au pluriel, 63. 
 forgotten, just as the kind of research that engages with it can only 
‘lutte[r] avec l’oubli’.12  
In brief, memory can be a way of talking about ways of being, 
in all their multiplicity, in a world of objects, in all their plurality. And, 
paradoxically, what is by definition an ephemeral process gives 
particular salience to memory. Thus, the innumerable manières de faire 
with which Certeau is characteristically concerned endure only to the 
extent that their medium is a form of memory which exists at the very 
margins of institutionalized frameworks of meaning, namely a 
‘mémoire sans langage’.13  
There is a strategic dimension to Certeau’s far-reaching but 
characteristically elliptical attempt to theorize memory: it is motivated 
by the aim of pre-empting the kinds of recuperation to which it is 
exposed. But it is precisely the exposure of memory to a limitless 
cultural space that transforms its identity and, potentially, the identities 
of those who come to be exposed to it as it operates in this mode. 
Thus, memory, operating as a distinctive process that is at once mental 
and social, individual and transindividual, can establish what we take to 
be a momentary fusion of the present and the infinity of lived 
experience, taking the form of a spectacular temporal compression, 
‘une présence à la pluralité des temps et [qui] ne se limite donc pas au 
passé’.14 The emergence of such a relation is of immense significance in 
that it conditions the very possibility of cultural action. We can work 
with or work through what is already there, something which Certeau 
can, it would appear, only capture by way of recourse to a neologism 
— ‘permaner’ — so as to explain how cultural activity results from an 
oscillation between what ‘permanates’ and what can in some sense be 
momentarily invented in the here and now.15 The paradox is that this 
cultural activity, though characteristically ephemeral, overcomes 
forgetting, effaces loss. 
 Memory, in brief, comes to be transformed by being identified 
with a theoretical project which is concerned above all with the 
ceaseless renegotiation of our relation with and access to culture, as 
distinct from the institutionalized medium through which canonical or 
historically documented forms of what we take to be the culture of the 
past come to be preserved, recorded, transmitted. Memory, considered 
as one of several possible agencies implicated in the space between the 
                                                 
12 L’Invention du quotidien, I, xxxv; xliii; 115; 133; xlii. Certeau’s engagement with such 
features of the everyday remains intractably exposed to the problem of how to 
document them; see Michael Sheringham, Everyday Life: Theories and Practices from 
Surrealism to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 218–19. For an 
extended account of the Certeau’s agent-centred hermeneutics of effective social 
practices, see also Jeremy Ahearne, Michel de Certeau: Interpretation and its Other 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1995). 
13 L’Invention du quotidien, I, 65. Compare the ‘mémoire silencieuse et repliée’ of the 
walkers, the Wandersmänner, in the unquantifiable city (I, 158) 
14 L’Invention du quotidien, I, 320 n.7. 
15 See La Culture au pluriel, 211. 
 embodied individual subject and the limitless collectivity, is revised in 
several ways — as object (it is as much the ephemeral as the 
monumental) and as a set of practices (it is as much an open-ended, 
though elusive and unpredictable, cultural process as it is a form of 
social containment). And the attempt to identify the different ways in 
which memory can be activated contributes in turn to an overt move in 
the direction of redefining what we might mean by culture: Certeau’s 
concern is ultimately with the almost insoluble task of characterizing 
the unmappable totality of everyday life.  
 
Winnicott’s theorization of culture is comparable, in that it hinges on 
the shifting space of contact between what he terms the individual and 
the ‘collective’, and different, in that what ultimately lies at the centre of 
his account is a modified notion of experience. The problem with 
which Winnicott finds himself confronted is the paucity of 
psychoanalytical theory applied to cultural experience, a deficit that 
prompts him to bring psychoanalysis into contact with more traditional 
or more established disciplines, like philosophy or theology.16 The 
framework within which he approaches this issue is that of the 
transitional object. The transitional object derives its value from the 
fact that its essentially paradoxical nature can productively be ‘accepted 
and tolerated’ (xii).17 Acceptance and tolerance of the paradoxical 
transitional object matter because it infuses the individual’s immersion 
in the world of experience — not in some abstract way, but, as 
Winnicott tentatively suggests, because the experience of the individual 
can be ‘infinitely enriched’ by means of a link which, he will argue, is 
creative and, by extension, cultural.  
The dimension of culture which is critical (though mentioned 
by Winnicott only in passing) is its temporality: it embraces past and 
future alike (xii). Just how this might happen is what we must consider; 
but we can see at the outset that on this point his theory converges 
with that of Certeau. This is an extension, Winnicott says, of the basic 
issue of the uses to which objects can be put. This extension into the 
space of culture leads Winnicott to formulate a theory based on 
proximity to the object field, the issue being ultimately the scope of 
what might be termed culture to be defined and in turn theorized as 
such.  
                                                 
16 Playing and Reality (London: Routledge, 1991), xi; this book (first published in 1971) 
includes the famous analysis of transitional objects written twenty years earlier and a 
number of subsequent treatments of creativity and culture. Further references are 
given in parentheses. 
17 The paradox is that ‘a baby creates an object but the object would not have been 
created as such if it had not already been there’ (Playing and Reality, 71). By recourse to 
‘split-off intellectual functioning’, it would be possible to resolve the paradox, but its 
value would be destroyed as a result. On the uses of paradox to characterize a 
psychoanalysis of objects more generally, including the paradox of a theory of so vast 
an object as culture that is typically tentative and indirect, see Malcolm Bowie, 
‘Psychoanalysis and Art: the Winnicott Legacy’, in L. Caldwell, ed., Art, Creativity, 
Living (London: Karnac, 2000), 11–29. 
 Winnicott’s essential move is a gesture towards a 
psychoanalytically informed theory of culture centred on the interplay 
between two realities, the psychic, in the first place, and the external, in 
the second, The model he develops appears perfectly simple: he makes 
an appeal to experience, or, more specifically, ‘a colouring of the whole 
attitude to external reality’ (65). It amounts, then, to a way of being in 
the world of external shared reality which is strongly marked 
existentially: the creative dimension of the self–world interaction thus 
understood ‘more that anything else […] makes the individual feel that 
life is worth living’ (65). We could conclude that subjectivity is 
decisively shaped by creativity as experienced by the individual, a view 
that derives some support from Winnicott’s claim that just such a 
notion of creativity, derived from the primary concept of play, is a 
universal feature of the self–world relation (67). It is dynamic in that it 
‘belongs to the approach of the individual to external reality’ and, 
except to the extent that illness inhibits it, is pervasive in that every 
element of such interactions is governed by this creative potential (68). 
A loss of creativity would amount to the loss of the sense that life is 
‘real or meaningful’ (69). To understand the universality of creativity, 
we must recognize its attitudinal basis, something that is ultimately 
derived from the experience of the infant vis-à-vis the object. What the 
psychic mechanisms of projection and introjection ultimately show is 
that ‘play is in fact neither a matter of inner psychic reality nor a matter of external 
reality’ (96), but rather of how the two come into contact through 
experience. 
If this model purports to be an account of the interaction of 
psychic and external realities, then the question arises of just how it can 
sustain generalizations regarding salient features of external reality as 
such; or, conversely, how we might advance generalizations concerning 
features of psychic and external realities alike which then have a 
bearing on the universal processes of creativity identified by Winnicott. 
The search for these is a tentative element of his enquiry; indeed, its 
tentativeness is discernible precisely in the care with which he here and 
there makes use of the word ‘culture’. Within Winnicott’s thinking on 
this problem, conducted in individual papers over a period of two 
decades, a number of threads emerge.  
First, our symbolic capacity is linked to a paradoxical form of 
separation, one which is not absolute, but is rather ‘a form of union’ 
(98). What first activates the symbolic dimension is the good enough 
mother, whose availability suffices to keep alive a mental representation 
of an image of the object. For the restoration of the infant’s ego 
structure allows him or her to construct for future use ‘a symbol of 
union’, by virtue of which even the experience of separation can yield 
benefits (97). Winnicott argues that important agencies develop as a 
result. An infant who is spared the experience of madness — an 
experience of separation that precipitates a collapse in the ‘personal 
continuity of existence’ — acquires a symbolic capacity which draws on his 
 or her organization of memories. In other words, it presupposes a 
memory system (97). 
Second, a model of culture as a generalized way of being is 
distinctive in that it takes the form of phenomena which, because they 
have no instinctual backing, are not climactic (98). The paradox is that 
non-climactic experiences devoid of instinctual backing lack nothing in 
intensity: playing is both exciting and precarious because of the vivid 
tension between a subjective experience of near-hallucination and 
objective perceptions of shared reality (52).18 Different from 
phenomena that originate in bodily functioning, or from those that 
relate to what Winnicott terms ‘environmental actuality’, they are 
infinitely variable, because based on interactions.19  
This is the framework within which Winnicott voices his more 
overt, though speculative, generalizations with regard to culture. The 
accentuation of experience is essential, in that he is concerned to 
develop concepts of creativity and by extension of culture which are 
universal (and therefore distinct from the range of received high 
cultures to which we might otherwise refer). For this reason, he 
hesitates, as we have seen, about using the word ‘culture’ at all. It would 
seem that culture is to be understood in psychoanalytic terms as the 
effect of what may happen in a ‘potential space’ which embraces the 
individual and his or her environment, subsuming the place originally 
occupied by the object (100). Moving beyond the properly 
psychoanalytic concern with health, Winnicott posits the conclusion 
that a special role of culture as such is to ‘provide the continuity in the 
human race that transcends personal experience’: the mechanism that 
allows some continuity between the subject and shared cultural 
experiences being play (100). To characterize the potential space, he 
invokes what might at first seem a problematic category, given the 
salience of loss within modernity, that of an ‘inherited tradition’. But he 
carefully characterizes it as a space which can only operate on the basis 
of a kind of social reciprocity, in that we are motivated to draw on it 
only if we recognize it as ‘somewhere to put what we find’. Clearly, the 
sphere in which we play is here vastly expanded and, even if we think 
of it as embodying entities as complex as traditions, the place it gives to 
the subject is no less vital.20 
One issue remains, which is that of the peculiar temporality of 
culture. Winnicott’s discussion of this aspect of experience is no more 
than indicative, but very suggestive, I think. He applies to the idea of 
inherited tradition the original subject–object model of separateness 
                                                 
18 Bowie describes what results as an intermediate space of ‘experiencing’, in 
‘Psychoanalysis and Art’, 14. 
19 Cf. Adam Phillips’s account of the contingencies to which intersubjective relations 
are prey (extending, as they do, over genetic, biographical and subjective factors), in 
Going Sane (London: Faber, 2006), ch. 2. 
20 See again Bowie on the ingenuity of this generalized model of play in its uses of 
objects, and in turn on its hermeneutic potential when applied to art, in 
‘Psychoanalysis and Art’, 28. 
 and union, in other words, of union in separation, concluding that we 
accept tradition as the basis on which we can be inventive: ‘it is not 
possible to be original except on the basis of tradition’ (99). This claim brings us 
full circle: our uses of objects, like the infant’s use of the transitional 
object, are of value because they embody not only our own creativity, 
but also cultural links which embrace past and future alike. On this 
point, Winnicott is, though very brief, quite explicit: if we value playing 
and cultural experience, it is because ‘these link the past, the present, 
and the future; they take up time and space’ (109). 
 
What, then, of loss? Certeau, I think, adumbrates a relation to 
temporality that is not so driven by constant reference back to the past: 
the problem of loss is attentuated as a result, all the more so because 
this understanding of how we can be in some sense present to past, 
present and future alike derives from an expanded conception of 
memory, one linked to ephemeral forms of creativity.21 In Winnicott’s 
account of play, loss is significantly downplayed, in that the relation 
between memory and its objects is no longer thought of disjunctively: 
subjectivity is shaped by exposure to a cultural space which, like 
Certeau’s, is multi-temporal and which, while not given, can be 
accessed through play, as we have seen. We seem to witness a break 
with the optic of loss and perhaps to discern hints at the scope of a 
future-oriented memory, at once uncannily familiar, but proximate only 
if we can finds ways of acknowledging how the subject happens to 
engage with it. A speculative theoretical stance vis-à-vis culture 
common to both thinkers generates an account of time as one crucial 
element of just such an intersubjective space. Here the break 
characteristic of modernity with highly determinate forms of tradition 
is fully assumed, even as that concept itself comes to be reinvented 
within a holistic temporal framework. 
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